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The protection of fundamental rights and human rights in the European Union has witnessed several phases and fluctuations. In the early days of European integration, whilst it would be exaggerated to brand the then Communities a 'villain,' there was no explicit recognition of fundamental rights/human rights as being part of Community law. I hope it should have become clear by now that the Union does not fit particularly well into any of these two extremes. But by comparison to the other EU institutions, the Court of Justice has been somewhat of a forerunner, taking the first steps towards a fundamental rights system already in 1969 and contributing in many respects to its further development.

The protection of fundamental rights and human rights in the European Union has witnessed several phases and fluctuations. In the early days of European integration, whilst it would be exaggerated to brand the then Communities a 'villain,' there was no explicit recognition of fundamental rights/human rights as being part of Community law. I hope it should have become clear by now that the Union does not fit particularly well into any of these two extremes. But by comparison to the other EU institutions, the Court of Justice has been somewhat of a forerunner, taking the first steps towards a fundamental rights system already in 1969 and contributing in many respects to its further development.

This article focuses on the organization of oral hearings at the European Court of Justice. It deals with both the decision to hold or not to hold an oral hearing, as a complement to the written part of the procedure, and the actual conduct of such hearings. This is done by drawing on the modifications introduced by the recast of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice undertaken in 2012 and the Practice Directions to Parties adopted by the Court in 2013 as well as actual practice following the entry into force of the new Rules of Procedure. The article also draws upon the experience of the present author as a judge at the Court since 2002 and chairman of the Rules of Procedure Committee of the Court since 2009. What role does the oral hearing play in the overall handling of cases and what have been the most recent developments in this regard? Some attention will also be paid to fundamental rights concerns, notably the right to a fair and public hearing and its relevance for the organization and conduct of hearings. The article will not address the broader notion of 'oral part of the procedure' to the extent that it covers the Opinion of the Advocate General as well. Nor shall I consider in any detail the organization of oral hearings by the other Union Courts, that is, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, where due to the nature of proceedings the oral hearing plays an even more important part than before the Court of Justice.

AbstractIt appears more and more often that cases brought before the European Court of Justice raise issues relating to two or more fundamental rights and the relation between them. In such situations, it is often necessary to establish a 'balance' between the fundamental rights concerned. In some cases, one of the rights involved is not a fundamental right in the strict sense but, for instance, an economic freedom (such as the free movement of goods) recognised under the basic EU Treaties. Another configuration may be a situation where, for instance, two of the fundamental rights which are at issue are to be found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights but only one of them appears in the European Convention on Human Rights. In such situations, one wonders what would be the relevance of Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establishes a direct link between the Charter and the European Convention. The present contribution will look at the question of balancing of EU fundamental rights in general and also at more specific problems arising in this context, such as the two problems identified above.

The history of humankind has been essentially a history of, for and by some men in power. The eighteenth century saw the abolition of slavery and the slave trade at least in some parts of the world while the nineteenth century saw a gradual emancipation of women. The present century will focus not only on the total eradication of slavery and the discrimination of women and other vulnerable groups but also see serious challenges to the idea of all animals (other than the so-called homo sapiens) as things and, as the case may be, private property. Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which entered into force in 2009, is a sign of changing times. According to this provision, "animals are sentient beings". But what does this mean in concrete terms? How to distinguish between different categories of animals (as few people advocate the equal treatment of, say, human beings, gorillas, sheep and flies)? This new Journal will provide a welcome forum for exploring such questions further. It should also provide a forum for legal analysis of more down-to-earth questions such as improving the normative framework for livestock farming in the short and medium term. I wish the new Journal every possible success in these formidable tasks.Professor Allan Rosas, Dr. juris, Dr. h.c.Judge at the European Court of Justice, LuxembourgProfessor at the College of Europe, BrugeDistinguished Jurist in Residence at the Dedman School of Law, SMU, Dallas

Whilst the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became part of binding primary EU law on 1 December 2009, constitutes an important codification and clarification of fundamental rights as they exist in the European Union, the field of application of the Charter is limited in a significant way: the Charter only applies when EU law is at stake. When national courts and authorities in the EU Member States are confronted with problems of purely national law, they are not obliged to apply the Charter but should instead rely on the national constitutional Bill of Rights as well as the international human rights instruments which are binding on the Member State in question. The borderline between EU law and national law is not always easy to establish in a concrete case. This article discusses theoretical and practical problems arising out of the application and interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the Charter is addressed to the Member States 'only when they are implementing Union law'. It is suggested to adopt a pragmatic case-by-case approach, asking oneself if there is another norm of Union law than a Charter provision which is directly relevant to a case in concreto. If the answer is yes, also the Charter should be applied, supposing that there is a Charter provision which could influence the outcome of the case. If the answer is in the negative, national courts and authorities are only obliged to apply national law, including the constitutional Bill of Rights and the international human rights obligations of the Member State concerned. ; Europos Sąjungos pagrindinių teisių chartija (toliau – Chartija) nuo 2009 m. gruodžio 1 d. tapo Europos Sąjungos (toliau – ES) privalomos pirminės teisės dalimi. Nors Chartija kodifikuoja ir aiškina Europos Sąjungoje garantuojamas pagrindines teises, tačiau Chartijos taikymas yra gana reikšmingai apribotas. Chartija taikoma tik tuo atveju, kai grėsmė kyla ES teisės normoms. Kai valstybių narių nacionaliniai teismai ir kitos institucijos susiduria vien tik su nacionalinės teisės problemomis, jos neprivalo taikyti Chartijos nuostatų, bet turėtų remtis nacionalinėmis konstitucinėmis normomis, kurios garantuoja pagrindinių žmogaus teisių apsaugą, bei tarptautinėmis žmogaus teisių sutartimis, pagal kurias valstybė narė yra prisiėmusi įsipareigojimus. Tačiau konkrečiose situacijose ne visada yra paprasta atskirti ES ir nacionalinės teisės taikymo sritis. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojamos teorinės ir praktinės problemos, kylančios taikant ir aiškinant Chartijos 51(1) straipsnį, pagal kurį Chartijos nuostatos yra skirtos valstybėms narėms tik "tais atvejais, kai šios įgyvendina Sąjungos teisę". Siūloma laikytis pragmatiško požiūrio ir vertinti kiekvieną situaciją atskirai. Todėl turėtų būti analizuojama, ar konkrečioje byloje, be Chartijos nuostatų, dar galima taikyti ir kitas ES teisės normas. Jei atsakymas yra teigiamas, tai tokioje byloje turėtų būti taikoma ir Chartija, preziumuojant, kad Chartijoje įtvirtintos nuostatos gali būti reikšmingos bylos baigčiai. Jei atsakymas yra neigiamas, nacionaliniai teismai ir kitos institucijos turėtų taikyti nacionalinius teisės aktus bei tarptautines sutartis, garantuojančias pagrindines žmogaus teises ir laisves.

AbstractThis chapter considers the ECJ procedure and, in particular, the length of time required for cases to be heard, especially in proceedings pertaining to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, an area in which the saying 'justice delayed, justice denied' has particular force. It examines in particular the new urgent procedure, conceived in order to enable the Court to decide a case falling under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within an expedited time-frame. It concludes that, while undue haste should be avoided, lengthy time-frames for court proceedings are more often than not a sign of poor case management. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice provides a special incentive for the ECJ to be vigilant as regards the length of court proceedings.

Articles 8-8e of the European Community Treaty extend municipal & European electoral rights in the country of residence rather than the country of nationality. These Articles do not grant nonnationals the right to vote in national parliamentary, regional, or referendum elections. In placing the question of voting rights within the broader framework of both constitutional & human rights developments, the basic assumption that only the citizens of a particular state or region should vote in national or regional elections is questioned. Recent discussions on "Nordic citizenship" & specific voting rights in this subnational context are discussed. M. Maguire